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NOT TOO LITTLE,  
BUT A LITTLE TOO LATE:  
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S REFUSAL TO 
CONSIDER NEW ISSUES RAISED BY 
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 
Christopher R. Prior∗ 
“Orderly rules of procedure do not require sacrifice of 
the rules of fundamental justice.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Rule 28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provide that “[i]f pertinent and significant authorities come to a 
party’s attention after the party’s brief has been filed—or after 
oral argument but before decision—a party may promptly advise 
the circuit clerk by letter, with a copy to all other parties, 
setting forth the citations.”2 The Rules go on to say that “[t]he 
letter must state the reasons for the supplemental citations, 
referring either to the page of the brief or to a point argued 
orally.”3 While Rule 28(j) provides for the consideration of new 
                                                          
∗ Brooklyn Law School Class of 2007; B.A., Queens College, City 
University of New York, 1999. The author would like to thank his family for 
their love and support. The author would also like to thank the staff of the 
Journal of Law and Policy, particularly Mark Sattinger. The author wishes to 
thank Professor Ursula Bentele for her assistance with numerous drafts of this 
Note. Finally, the author would like to thank John Miras, John Mattoon and 
Virginia Nimick. 
1 Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941). 
2 FED. R. APP. P. 28(j). 
3 Id. 
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authority, the general rule4 is that appellate courts are under no 
obligation to consider arguments that were not previously raised, 
either at the trial level or in the appellate brief.5 This general 
rule stems from English common law6 and is said to protect the 
interests of adverse appellate parties7 and to conserve judicial 
resources.8 However, there is no clear answer or direction when 
Rule 28(j) and the general rule conflict, and a party attempts to 
raise a potentially dispositive issue based on newly issued 
authority. 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has dealt with several 
such conflicts, and has consistently declined to consider 
arguments based on authority not cited in a party’s original 
appellate brief. In one recent case, United States v. Bordon,9 a 
concurring judge noted that the Eleventh Circuit differs from 
other Circuit Courts of Appeal in its rejection of relevant 
authority decided after appellants have handed in their briefs.10 
In Bordon, the Eleventh Circuit declined to hear an appeal of a 
criminal sentence based on a recent United States Supreme 
Court decision.11 The Bordon decision mirrored the Eleventh 
                                                          
4 Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General 
Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1987). The 
“general rule” is that new issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 
See id. at 1024-26. 
5 Sarah M.R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 
251, 251 (2004). 
6 See Martineau, supra note 4, at 1026; Rhett R. Dennerline, Pushing 
Aside the General Rule in Order to Raise New Issues on Appeal, 64 IND. L.J. 
985, 985-86 (1989). 
7 See Dennerline, supra note 6, at 987-88. 
8 Martineau, supra note 4, at 1032. 
9 421 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2005). 
10 Id. at 1208 (Hill, J., concurring). Hill concurred only on the doctrine 
of stare decisis. Id. at 1208-09. 
11 Id. at 1206 n.1. The court declined to hear the Bordons’ argument 
based on United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In Booker, the 
Supreme Court found that the federal sentencing guidelines were 
unconstitutional to the extent that they allow sentencing judges to rely on 
facts not admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. at 244. 
PRIOR OUT 3/5/2007  12:35 AM 
 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT & SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 251 
Circuit’s approach to a similar issue in United States v. Levy,12 
in which two dissenting judges expressed harsh criticism of the 
court’s rationale.13 Other circuits have been more flexible, 
holding that when a relevant case is decided while an appeal is 
pending, “a 28(j) letter is a perfectly appropriate avenue by 
which to present” new arguments.14 
This Note will argue that the Eleventh Circuit’s inflexible 
approach denies litigants due process and frustrates the intent 
behind recent changes to Rule 28(j). First, this Note will 
examine the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to, and rejection of, 
28(j) letters that attempt to raise new arguments based on cases 
decided after the filing of appellate briefs by discussing several 
Eleventh Circuit decisions, including Bordon, McGinnis v. 
Ingram Equipment Co.15 and Levy. Part I will conclude with a 
discussion of several cases in which the Eleventh Circuit has 
maintained its refusal to hear post-brief supplemental authority 
even when the Supreme Court has remanded the case for re-
sentencing in light of the Court’s recent decisions. Part II will 
analyze the Eleventh Circuit’s justification for its rule on new 
issues raised by supplemental authority. Part III considers the 
possible due process implications of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
approach, and argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s rule is contrary 
to the congressional intent behind recent changes to Rule 28(j). 
This Note will then explore approaches of other Circuit Courts 
of Appeal, most of which allow for new arguments when 
authority is handed down after the deadline for appellate briefs, 
and then examine the approach taken by state courts in handling 
supplemental authority. Finally, this Note will call for an 
addition to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to ensure 
that litigants and defendants receive fair adjudication of their 
claims. 
                                                          
12 United States v. Levy, 374 F.3d 1023 (11th Cir. 2004), reh’g denied 
379 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004), and reh’g denied en banc 391 F.3d 1327 
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, vacated 545 U.S. 1101 (2005), remanded to 
416 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 643 (2005). 
13 Levy, 391 F.3d at 1335-56 (Tjoflat and Barkett, JJ., dissenting). 
14 United States v. Cordoza-Estrada, 385 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2004). 
15 McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., 918 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir. 1990). 
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I.  THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AND REJECTION OF POST-BRIEF 
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 
The Eleventh Circuit has heard numerous cases in which 
parties have attempted to raise a new issue based on post-brief 
supplemental authority. In addition to cases such as Bordon, in 
which the court declined to hear an argument rooted in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,16 the 
Eleventh Circuit has refused to hear arguments based on Blakely 
v. Washington17 and Apprendi v. New Jersey.18 Bordon was 
merely the latest case to highlight a dispute between Judge 
James C. Hill and the majority of the judges on the Eleventh 
Circuit. The disagreement among the judges of the Eleventh 
Circuit dates back more than 15 years to McGinnis v. Ingram 
Equipment Co., Inc.,19 in which Judge Hill dissented from a 
majority decision applying the Eleventh Circuit’s rule rejecting 
supplemental authority to civil cases.20 The majority opinion in 
McGinnis articulated several reasons why declining to consider 
arguments based on authority first raised in a supplemental 
filing, such as a 28(j) letter, is not a “miscarriage of justice.”21 
Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit used the reasoning of 
McGinnis and the doctrine of stare decisis to justify its rejection 
of newly raised arguments, even when the Supreme Court has 
remanded sentencing decisions for reconsideration.22 The 
                                                          
16 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
17 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The Blakely Court held that “the prosecutor 
[must] prove to a jury all facts legally essential to the punishment” and that 
sentencing determinations that occur without a jury determination of those 
legally essential facts violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Id. at 
313-14. 
18 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Apprendi, the Court invalidated a state 
sentencing guideline scheme that allowed a judge to impose punishment based 
on facts not admitted to by the defendant or proven to the jury. Id. at 491-92. 
19 918 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir. 1990). 
20 Id. at 1498. 
21 Id. at 1496-97. 
22 See, e.g., United States v. Cotney, 143 F. App’x 290 (11th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Dockery, 401 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2005); United 
PRIOR OUT 3/5/2007  12:35 AM 
 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT & SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 253 
Eleventh Circuit’s rule was also the subject of spirited debate in 
United States v. Levy, in which both the majority and dissenting 
opinions weighed the benefits and drawbacks of the court’s strict 
rule on supplemental authority. 
A.  United States v. Bordon 
Luis Adel Bordon and his sons, Luis Bordon and Adel 
Bordon, were convicted in August 1998 of “conspiring to 
commit money laundering by conducting financial transactions 
involving the proceeds of an illegal gambling activity and 
concealing the nature and proceeds of the illegal gambling 
activity.”23 A trial court sentenced the senior Bordon to 57 
months in prison and his two sons to 46 months each; 
additionally, all were ordered to forfeit their interest in 
approximately $5.8 million.24 
The district court judge imposed a lower sentence than was 
required by the federal sentencing guidelines, finding that the 
nature of the crime “departed from the heartland consideration 
of the Sentencing Commission.”25 Other mitigating factors also 
led the trial judge to impose a lesser sentence than that called for 
in the sentencing guidelines.26 The Bordons appealed the 
conviction and forfeiture order, and the government cross-
appealed from the trial judge’s downward departure from the 
                                                          
States v. Ardley, 242 F.3d 989 (11th Cir. 2001). 
23 421 F.3d 1202, 1203 (11th Cir. 2005). The Bordons were convicted 
of violations of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1955 (2005) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(h) 
(2005). The Bordons were found to have been running a “bolita” operation. 
Bordon, 421 F.3d at 1204. Bolita is “a game of chance having the character 
of a lottery in which a bag of small numbered balls is tossed about until only 
one remains or until one is grasped at random, the ball so selected being 
considered as bearing the winning number.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 248 (Philip 
Babcock Grove ed., Merriam Webster 1993). 
24 Bordon, 421 F.3d at 1204. 
25 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
26 Id. 
PRIOR OUT 3/5/2007  12:35 AM 
254 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
sentencing guidelines.27 
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the Bordons’ convictions and 
the forfeiture order, but remanded the case to the trial court for 
re-sentencing, ruling that the district court judge had used the 
wrong “base level” in determining the sentence.28 On remand, 
in accordance with the direction of the Court of Appeals, the 
district court sentenced the senior Bordon to 97 months and his 
sons to 78 months each.29 The Bordons appealed, and the 
Eleventh Circuit again vacated and remanded for new 
sentencing, holding that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the 
Court of Appeals’ ruling as stripping the judge of discretion to 
depart downward from the sentencing guidelines.30 
While the Eleventh Circuit was considering the Bordons’ 
second appeal, Congress passed the PROTECT Act31 and a 
revised version of the sentencing guidelines that “probably” 
would have resulted in a “significantly reduced guideline range” 
for the Bordons.32 Section 3742(g)(1) of the PROTECT Act, 
known as the Feeney Amendment, prevents district courts from 
retroactively applying revisions to the sentencing guidelines.33 
The district court sentenced the Bordons for a third time in 
January 2004 based on the Eleventh Circuit’s remand and the 
Feeney Amendment.34 The court sentenced Luis Adel Bordon to 
97 months and Luis and Adel Bordon to 78 months, 
                                                          
27 Id. 
28 Id. (citing United States v. Bordon, 228 F.3d 412 (11th Cir. 2000) 
[hereinafter Bordon I]). 
29 United States v. Bordon, 421 F.3d 1202, 1205 (11th Cir. 2005). 
30 Id. (citing United States v. Bordon, 48 F. App’x 326 (11th Cir. 2002) 
[hereinafter Bordon II]). 
31 Id. PROTECT is an acronym for Prosecutorial Remedies and Other 
Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003. Prosecutorial 
Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.). 
32 United States v. Bordon, 421 F.3d 1202, 1205 (11th Cir. 2005). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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respectively.35 The Bordons appealed to the Eleventh Circuit for 
a third time.36 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Bordons’ arguments in 
their entirety.37 The per curiam opinion noted that appellants 
attempted, before oral argument, to assert that the district 
court’s sentence was excessive in light of Booker.38 The court, 
rejecting the claims first asserted in the supplemental filings, 
held that the Bordons’ “Booker claim was not timely and [was] 
thus subject to [the] court’s prudential rule.”39 
Judge Hill concurred “with lack of enthusiasm.”40 Hill noted 
his dissent in McGinnis, where he objected to the Eleventh 
Circuit’s rule on supplemental authority.41 Hill concurred only 
on the basis of stare decisis, with the hope that the doctrine 
would be “tempered with fiat justita ruat coelum”42—a reference 
to Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, Fla.,43 in which Chief Judge 
Tuttle declared: “Let justice be done though the heavens may 
fall.”44 
                                                          
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 1206. The Bordons argued that: (1) the district court erred in 
applying the Feeney Amendment; (2) the “retroactive application” doctrine of 
the Feeney Amendment violated the ex post facto clause of the United States 
Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3); (3) the district court 
miscalculated the monetary loss associated with the crime; and (4) the 17 
months between the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Bordon II and the re-
sentencing violated the Bordons’ right to sentencing without unreasonable 
delay. Bordon, 421 F.3d at 1206. 
38 United States v. Bordon, 421 F.3d 1202, 1206 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1208 (Hill, J., concurring). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1209. 
43 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962). 
44 United States v. Bordon, 421 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(Hill, J., concurring) (quoting Hampton, 304 F.2d at 330). 
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B.  McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., Inc. 
In a vital Eleventh Circuit case on this issue, Terrell 
McGinnis filed a lawsuit against his former employer, Ingram 
Equipment, following his termination in March 1986.45 
McGinnis alleged discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights 
Act of 186646 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,47 a 
total of four claims.48 After a bench trial, the district court 
entered a judgment for McGinnis, holding that Ingram 
Equipment had violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866.49 Ingram 
Equipment appealed, presenting four arguments in its brief.50 At 
oral argument before a three-judge panel, Ingram argued that 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union51—decided four days before 
the Eleventh Circuit heard arguments in McGinnis—should 
control and limit federal jurisdiction over § 1981 claims.52 A 
majority of the panel agreed with Ingram, vacating the judgment 
and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of 
Patterson.53 The Eleventh Circuit vacated the panel’s decision 
and agreed to hear the case en banc.54 
Sitting en banc, the Eleventh Circuit rejected Ingram’s 
                                                          
45 McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 1491, 1493 (11th 
Cir. 1990). 
46 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (2005). 
47 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (2005). 
48 McGinnis, 918 F.2d at 1493. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. Ingram asserted that (1) McGinnis failed to prove intentional 
discrimination; (2) the district court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous 
and should be set aside; (3) the district court erred in restricting the use of 
McGinnis’s pre-trial deposition at trial; and (4) the trial judge “impermissibly 
injected himself into the proceedings.” Id. 
51 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
52 McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 1491, 1493 (11th 
Cir. 1990). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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Patterson appeal.55 The court noted that “[a] party normally 
waives its right to argue issues not raised in its initial brief.”56 
The court rejected Ingram’s argument that it could not have 
predicted the outcome of Patterson, reasoning that the appellant 
was free to assert a lack of jurisdiction regardless of the 
Supreme Court’s Patterson holding.57 
Judge Hill dissented, noting, “[t]his is a hard case. The 
court, today, makes bad law.”58 Hill argued that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Patterson limited federal jurisdiction over § 
1981 claims.59 The dissent accused the majority of ignoring the 
law, and instead seeking the “morally right result”60 of holding 
a company liable for discrimination when an employee “suffered 
many more racial indignities at the hands of the Company than 
any one citizen should be called upon to bear in a lifetime.”61 
Additionally, Judge Hill asserted that the Eleventh Circuit 
put appellate litigants in the uncomfortable position of having to 
choose between losing an argument to waiver or being subject to 
possible sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.62 Hill expressed concern that the majority’s rule 
forced appellate counsel to confront a “Hobbesian dilemma:” 
refrain from making an argument because of existing adverse 
case law and thus lose that argument in future proceedings, or 
make the argument and risk Rule 11 sanctions.63 He whimsically 
suggested that attorneys facing such a dilemma “consult their 
local astrologer or psychic to find out whether existing case law 
                                                          
55 Id. at 1496. 
56 Id. (citing FSLIC v. Haralson, 813 F.2d 370, 373 n.3 (11th Cir. 
1987); Rogero v. Noone, 704 F.2d 518, 520 n.1 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
57 McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 1491, 1496 (11th 
Cir. 1990). 
58 Id. at 1498 (Hill, J., dissenting). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. (quoting McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., 685 F. Supp. 224, 
228 (N.D. Ala. 1988)). 
62 McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 1491, 1499 (11th 
Cir. 1990). 
63 Id. at 1500. 
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in the area will change.”64 Perhaps more seriously, Hill 
suggested that attorneys facing the Hobbesian dilemma “consult 
their malpractice insurers in case their astrologer or psychic’s 
vision [was] not too clear.”65 
The majority responded to Judge Hill’s stinging dissent. The 
court asserted that despite the contrary assertions of Ingram 
Equipment and Judge Hill, the issue of federal jurisdiction over 
§ 1981 claims was available prior to Patterson.66 The majority 
noted that Patterson was decided by the Fourth Circuit four 
months before McGinnis’ claims went to trial and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on the § 1981 issue three months before 
trial.67 
The majority also dismissed Judge Hill’s concerns about 
potential Rule 11 sanctions for an appellate attorney that 
advanced a novel legal argument in the face of adverse 
precedent.68 The court, citing advisory committee notes on a 
1983 amendment to Rule 11, noted the Rule’s good faith 
provision, saying that the Rule “is not intended to chill an 
attorney’s enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal 
theories.”69 The court distinguished the cases Judge Hill cited in 
support of his concerns about Rule 11 sanctions from McGinnis, 
noting that the attorneys in those cases had misrepresented the 
law.70 
                                                          
64 Id. at 1501. 
65 Id. at 1501 n.11. 
66 Id. at 1496. 
67 Id. 
68 McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 1491, 1496 (11th 
Cir. 1990). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1496-97. 
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C. The Eleventh Circuit’s New Issue Dispute Revisited: 
United States v. Levy 
1. Background 
The Eleventh Circuit’s rule against hearing new issues based 
on supplemental filings was a matter of debate in United States 
v. Levy.71 Levy’s first appeal to the Eleventh Circuit recounted 
the facts of his case. A federal grand jury indicted Raphael Levy 
and 12 others on 52 counts of various offenses related to a large 
fraud scheme.72 Levy and his codefendants were accused of 
soliciting funds for investing in viatical settlements—schemes 
which involve the purchase of life insurance policies or benefits 
thereof at a discounted rate from terminally ill persons—then 
misappropriating funds for their own use.73 
Levy was charged with multiple counts of mail fraud, 
conspiracy to commit money laundering, and money 
laundering.74 In a written plea agreement, Levy pled guilty to 
conspiracy to commit mail fraud and conspiracy to commit 
money laundering.75 The plea agreement stated Levy could be 
sentenced to any term provided for by the sentencing guidelines, 
and that he waived his right to appeal any sentence imposed.76 
In exchange for his plea, the government dismissed the 
remaining counts against Levy.77 The government further agreed 
not to oppose Levy’s request for sentence reduction based on his 
acceptance of responsibility, to consider filing a sentence 
reduction motion pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the United States 
                                                          
71 United States v. Levy, 374 F.3d 1023 (11th Cir. 2004), reh’g denied 
379 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004), and reh’g denied en banc 391 F.3d 1327 
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, vacated 545 U.S. 1101 (2005), remanded to 
416 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 643 (2005). 
72 Levy, 374 F.3d at 1024. 
73 Id. at 1024-25. 
74 Id. at 1025. 
75 Id. 
76 United States v. Levy, 374 F.3d 1023, 1025-26 (11th Cir. 2004). 
77 Id. at 1025. 
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Sentencing Guidelines, and to stipulate that Levy derived 
approximately $10.9 million from the scheme.78 The government 
also agreed to recommend that the district court impose 
concurrent sentences on the counts to which Levy pled guilty.79 
The Pre-sentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) filed by a 
probation officer recommended numerous enhancements to 
Levy’s sentence based on the amount of money involved in the 
scheme, the level of planning and sophistication, the 
vulnerability of the victims, and Levy’s leadership role.80 Based 
on Levy’s criminal history and terms of his plea agreement, he 
was eligible for a sentence of between 135 and 168 months.81 
The PSI noted that under the sentencing guidelines, a concurrent 
sentence is proper unless the highest maximum sentence is less 
than the total punishment recommended by the guidelines.82 
Aware that such a situation existed in Levy’s case, the PSI 
recommended consecutive sentences.83 Upset with the possible 
deviation from the sentencing guidelines, Levy objected to the 
PSI on several occasions.84 
At Levy’s sentencing hearing, the district court, despite 
Levy’s objections, heard evidence regarding the vulnerability of 
the victims of the scheme.85 The government fulfilled its 
obligation and recommended concurrent sentences.86 
Nevertheless, the district court sentenced Levy to 120- and 48-
                                                          
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1026. 
81 United States v. Levy, 374 F.3d 1023, 1026 (11th Cir. 2004). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. The highest maximum sentence for the most serious crime to 
which Levy pled guilty was 120 months—15 months less than the 135-month 
minimum required by the sentencing guidelines. Id. 
84 Id. at 1027-28. 
85 Id. at 1028-29. The government, citing the terms of the plea 
agreement, noted that it could not itself offer any evidence on the 
vulnerability of Levy’s victims. Id. at 1028. Instead, the court heard 
testimony from an attorney representing three victims in bankruptcy 
proceedings and from varied victims. Id. at 1028-29. 
86 United States v. Levy, 374 F.3d 1023, 1029 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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month sentences to be served consecutively, a total of 168 
months.87 Levy appealed his sentence to the Eleventh Circuit, 
contending that the government breached the plea agreement and 
that the district court deprived him of due process by hearing 
evidence regarding the vulnerability of his victims.88 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Levy’s appeals.89 Levy 
petitioned for re-hearing, arguing in part that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Blakely, requiring all facts relevant to a 
sentence under the federal guidelines, was controlling.90 The 
Eleventh Circuit rejected his Blakely claim, holding that Levy 
waived that argument by not “timely rais[ing] it in his initial 
brief on appeal.”91 The court conceded Levy’s inability to 
predict the Supreme Court’s ruling in Blakely, but noted that the 
argument that sentences based on facts not determined by a jury 
violate the Sixth Amendment was available to Levy before the 
Court’s decision.92 In short, the Eleventh Circuit held that the 
Blakely issue was available to Levy before his petition for 
rehearing.93 
2. Levy’s Petition for En Banc Rehearing 
Levy requested an en banc hearing of his appeal on the 
Blakely issue.94 Once again, the Eleventh Circuit rejected his 
argument as untimely.95 The court reiterated its “long-standing 
rule that issues raised for the first time in a petition for 
rehearing and not raised in an appellant’s initial brief will not be 
considered.”96 This section will first analyze the arguments of 
the two dissenting opinions—filed by Judge Tjoflat and Judge 
                                                          
87 Id. 1029. 
88 Id. at 1029-30. 
89 Id. at 1030-35. 
90 United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 1241-42 (11th Cir. 204). 
91 Id. at 1242. 
92 Id. at 1243 n.3. 
93 Id. at 1243. 
94 United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 2004). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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Barkett—and then discuss the majority’s approach. 97 
a.  The Dissenting Opinions 
The two dissenting opinions raised four objections to the 
majority’s rule: (1) the Eleventh Circuit’s rule, as it applies to 
criminal cases, limits the principles of retroactivity when new 
law is handed down while a criminal case is pending; (2) the 
Eleventh Circuit erred by deeming Levy’s Blakely argument as 
waived rather than forfeited; (3) it left the Eleventh Circuit 
alone among Circuit Courts of Appeal; and (4) it encouraged 
appellate counsel to brief every possible issue for fear of losing 
an unraised issue to Eleventh Circuit procedural rules.98 
Judge Tjoflat first argued the majority’s decision conflicted 
with Supreme Court precedent on retroactivity.99 In Griffith v. 
Kentucky,100 the Supreme Court held that “a new rule for the 
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to 
all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet 
final.”101 Tjoflat noted that the Supreme Court said that failure 
to apply decisions retroactively “violates basic norms of 
constitutional adjudication.”102 He further claimed that the 
Eleventh Circuit “essentially superimposed an additional 
requirement onto retroactivity determinations”—a requirement 
that the defendant had previously raised the issue upon which 
the Supreme Court subsequently ruled.103 
                                                          
97 Judge Tjoflat, joined by Judge Barkett, dissented from a similar ruling 
using similar rationale. See United States v. Ardley, 273 F.3d 991, 995-1006 
(11th Cir. 2001) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
98 Levy, 391 F.3d at 1336-37 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
99 Id. at 1337-38. 
100 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
101 Id. at 328. A criminal judgment is final when “a judgment of 
conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the 
time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally 
denied.” Id. at 321 n.6. 
102 United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 127 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)). 
103 Id. at 1340-41 (citations omitted). 
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The dissent also took issue with what Judge Tjoflat perceived 
as the court’s mischaracterization of Levy’s Blakely argument as 
“waived.”104 Tjoflat distinguished “waiver,” the “intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,”105 from 
“forfeiture,” “the failure to make the timely assertion of a 
right,”106 and argued that Levy could only have forfeited a 
Blakely argument because he was unaware of any such 
argument.107 Tjoflat noted that Levy’s first appellate brief was 
filed with the Eleventh Circuit more than a year before the 
Supreme Court even granted certiorari in Blakely.108 In addition, 
Tjoflat noted that the Eleventh Circuit precedent regarding the 
constitutionality of the federal sentencing guidelines was 
squarely against Levy.109 In effect, Tjoflat asserted that the 
Eleventh Circuit had ruled that Levy knowingly relinquished a 
right he did not know existed.110 
Judge Tjoflat also criticized the majority’s statement that its 
rule against hearing new issues was a long-standing one.111 The 
dissent cited Eleventh Circuit opinions in which the court 
considered previously unraised objections based on new case 
law.112 Tjoflat pointed to other circuits which consistently follow 
a different rule concerning arguments based on newly issued 
                                                          
104 Id. at 1342. 
105 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
106 Id. at 733. 
107 Levy, 391 F.3d at 1341 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
108 United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2004). 
109 Id. at 1342. The Eleventh Circuit had previously rejected an 
argument that the Sixth Amendment precluded a judicial determination, 
without a jury finding, of facts that would increase a defendant’s sentence. 
United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001). 
110 Levy, 391 F.3d at 1342 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
111 Id. at 1343. 
112 Id. at 1343-44. Justice Tjoflat cited United States v. Candelario, 240 
F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the court would review a 
previously unraised Apprendi argument for plain error) and United States v. 
Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 529 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that the court would 
review an issue raised first in defendant’s reply brief and relying upon a 
recent Supreme Court decision for plain error). 
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authority.113 In his decision, Judge Tjoflat included two 
footnotes spanning most of three pages discussing pre- and post-
Blakely decisions from other circuit courts in which the courts 
considered a new issue based on recent authority.114 Tjoflat 
chided the Eleventh Circuit, saying that he “[did] not understand 
how this court [could] continue to reject the sound reasoning of 
our sister circuits without any sort of explanation or even an 
acknowledgment of those cases.”115 
Finally, Judge Tjoflat expressed concern that the Eleventh 
Circuit’s rule would “[send] a clear message to appellate counsel 
that they should brief any claim that passes the laugh test 
regardless of whether it has any support in, or is even squarely 
foreclosed by, our own precedent.”116 He cited Supreme Court 
and Eleventh Circuit precedent expressing concern that if 
appellate courts have too strict a rule on hearing arguments, 
counsel would have incentive to raise every conceivable issue at 
every point in the judicial process.117 
For example, Judge Tjoflat noted Johnson v. United 
States,118 the Supreme Court worried that an inflexible rule 
against hearing new issues, especially issues that might 
conceivably be foreclosed by the Eleventh Circuit’s Bordon/Levy 
rule, “would result in counsel’s inevitably making a long and 
virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were 
plainly supported by existing precedent.”119 Similarly, Judge 
Tjoflat pointed out that the Eleventh Circuit has warned 
attorneys “to be highly selective about the issues to be argued on 
appeal.”120 The court advised attorneys to “select with 
                                                          
113 United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1345 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1348. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 1348-50. 
118 520 U.S. 461 (1997). 
119 Id. at 468. 
120 United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1349 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Battle, 163 F.3d 1, 1-2 (11th 
Cir. 1998)). 
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dispassionate and detached mind[s] the issues that common sense 
and experience tell [them] are likely to be dispositive. [They] 
must reject other issues or give them short treatment.”121 
Judge Tjoflat worried that the Eleventh Circuit’s virtual 
blanket rule rejecting new issues raised in supplemental authority 
“essentially tell[s] counsel that they should ‘raise every colorable 
claim on appeal,’ and that if they are too ‘highly selective about 
the issues to be argued on appeal’ they may do a great injury to 
their clients.”122 Tjoflat expressed concern that “counsel [would] 
raise more claims on appeal . . .and that the arguments 
supporting those claims [would] necessarily be less clear and 
specific.”123 The effect on the justice system would be severe: 
“Such kitchen-sink briefs will, of course, make this court’s work 
more difficult and waste judicial resources, not to mention 
counsel’s own time.”124 
Judge Barkett joined Judge Tjoflat in dissenting. Barkett 
noted that “Levy could not have raised a Sixth Amendment 
objection to his sentencing because in United States v. Sanchez, 
[decided] three years before Blakely was handed down, [the 
Eleventh Circuit] held that Apprendi does not apply to the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.”125 Noting that “[o]ur internal 
circuit rules for how and whether an issue can be raised on 
appeal cannot override the concerns about fundamental fairness 
and the integrity of judicial review that the Supreme Court 
identified in Griffith,”126 Judge Barkett said the Eleventh Circuit 
might be “violat[ing] constitutional norms.”127 
Finally, Barkett agreed with Tjoflat on the potential impact 
                                                          
121 Battle, 163 F.3d at 2 (quoting John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages and 
Twenty Minutes Revisited 14 (1987) (revised version of Twenty Pages and 
Twenty Minutes—Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 30 SW. L.J. 801 (1976)). 
122 Levy, 391 F.3d at 1349-50 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original). 
123 Id. at 1350. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 1351 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). 
126 United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004). 
127 Id. 
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of the Eleventh Circuit’s rule on the judicial system.128 Barkett 
argued that the court’s rule gives litigants “an incentive to flood 
the federal courts with countless claims that are clearly 
foreclosed by current precedent . . . . The district courts (and 
this court) will then be forced to address those claims over and 
over again. This is not a very effective way of conserving scarce 
judicial resources.”129 
b.  The Majority Response 
The majority opinion defended its rule against the dissent’s 
arguments. The court narrowly construed Griffith, saying that 
the decision did not affect procedural rules on unpreserved or 
unraised issues,130 dismissed concerns about overburdened 
courts,131 and addressed concerns that the majority had confused 
waiver and forfeiture.132 
While acknowledging that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Griffith applied new law to pending criminal prosecutions, the 
Levy majority found that “nothing in Griffith saved an 
unpreserved error in a direct appeal.”133 Additionally, the Levy 
court noted that the Supreme Court itself had limited 
retroactivity, saying that application of new rules should be 
“subject, of course, to established principles of waiver, harmless 
error, and the like.”134 
The majority distinguished the Court’s retroactive application 
of a new rule in Griffith from Levy. In Griffith, the Eleventh 
Circuit explained, the defendants repeatedly challenged the 
government’s use of preemptory challenges to prospective 
jurors.135 The Levy court noted that the “defendants properly 
                                                          
128 Id. at 1356 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 1329. 
131 Id. at 1332. 
132 United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 2004). 
133 Id. at 1329. 
134 Id. at 1331 (citing Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 59 n.4 (1985)). 
135 Id. at 1330. 
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presented and preserved their constitutional challenges to the 
prosecution’s use of preemptory strikes both during trial and 
throughout direct review.”136 The opinion employed a narrow 
reading of Griffith, saying that the Supreme Court’s holding in 
that case “cannot, and does not, control a situation in which the 
defendant, such as Levy, never raised nor preserved a 
constitutional challenge, but, instead, raises it for the first time 
in a petition for rehearing after this Court has affirmed his 
conviction and sentence.”137 
The Levy majority also dismissed concerns about over-
burdened courts forced to consider every conceivable claim. The 
court noted that attorneys already have a procedural incentive to 
raise all claims, yet refrain from doing so. “If defendants were 
going to raise a long and useless laundry list of objections, they 
already would have been doing exactly that in the district court 
so objections could receive full de novo review by this Court, 
rather than plain-error review.”138 The majority also claimed 
that any concerns regarding over-burdened trial courts were 
unfounded because the Eleventh Circuit’s rule allows for issues 
to be raised in the initial brief to the court.139 
Finally, the majority opinion said that the dissent 
misunderstood the waiver/forfeiture distinction. The majority 
argued that “the issue is whether this Court will apply its well-
established procedural rules” and not consider claims not raised 
in an initial brief, rather than the distinction between waiver, 
forfeiture or abandonment.140 
The court accused the dissent of being “internally 
inconsistent” by recognizing that procedural rules can and 
should be enforced when considering issues not raised at trial, 
but denying the circuit court the power to apply procedural rules 
to issues not properly raised early in the appellate process.141 
                                                          
136 Id. (emphasis in original). 
137 Id. at 1331. 
138 United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 1334. 
141 Id. at 1335. 
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The majority questioned why “[t]he dissent never explain[ed] 
why enforcing trial-level procedural default rules by limiting 
appellate review to plain error is somehow permissible under the 
Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine, but enforcing appellate-
level procedural default rules is not.”142 In closing, the Eleventh 
Circuit majority defended its rule, saying “[t]his Court’s 
application of well-established procedural rules is prudent and 
well-established.”143 
Despite being rebuffed twice by the Eleventh Circuit, Levy 
continued to press his appeal. The Supreme Court vacated his 
sentence and remanded to the Eleventh Circuit for further 
consideration in light of Booker.144 The Eleventh Circuit’s 
response to the remand highlights the court’s unrelenting 
rejection of new issues raised after appellate briefs are filed. 
D.  The Eleventh Circuit and Remands From the United 
States Supreme Court 
The Eleventh Circuit, in its third hearing of Levy’s claims, 
declined to allow for review of his Booker claim.145 This marked 
one of several occasions where the Eleventh Circuit has 
enforced its procedural rule against hearing post-brief 
supplemental authority even when expressly ordered by the 
Supreme Court to reconsider a case. 
In United States v. Ardley,146 the Eleventh Circuit declined 
to hear an appeal of a criminal sentence based on the High 
Court’s ruling in Apprendi, saying “[n]othing in the Apprendi 
decision suggests that we are obligated to consider an issue not 
raised in any of the briefs that appellant has filed with us.”147 
                                                          
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 United States v. Levy, 125 S. Ct. 2542 (2005). 
145 United States v. Levy, 416 F.3d 1273, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2005). 
146 United States v. Ardley, 202 F.3d 287 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. 
granted, vacated 531 U.S. 1063 (2001), remanded to 242 F.3d 989 (11th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied 533 U.S. 962 (2001), reh’g denied en banc 273 F.3d 991 
(11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 535 U.S. 979 (2002). 
147 Ardley, 242 F.3d at 990. 
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The Eleventh Circuit stuck by its rule on supplemental 
authority in Ardley even after a remand order in the case from 
the Supreme Court. The court held the Apprendi decision did 
not require consideration of an issue that had not been raised in 
any of the appellant’s briefs.148 The Eleventh Circuit decided 
there was nothing in the Supreme Court’s remand order 
“requiring that [it] treat the case as though the Apprendi issue 
had been timely raised in this Court.”149 Noting its own 
precedent, the court held that a remand order does not mandate 
a specific outcome.150 
Similarly, when Raphael Levy came before the Eleventh 
Circuit for the third time in 2005 on remand from the Supreme 
Court the Eleventh Circuit rejected his Booker appeal, saying 
that the Supreme Court’s remand did not “mandate any 
particular outcome as to the defendant’s sentence, nor [did the 
remand] preclude this Court from applying its prudential rules in 
a uniform and consistent manner.”151 The Eleventh Circuit again 
noted that principles of retroactivity are subject to procedural 
rules.152 The court pointed to Shea, where the Supreme Court 
held that retroactivity is subject “to established principles of 
waiver, harmless error, and the like.”153 
                                                          
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. See United States v. Miller, 492 F.2d 37, 40 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(holding that if the Supreme Court expected a specific result, “certiorari 
could have been granted and [the] case summarily reversed . . . rather than 
being remanded for further consideration”). The Fifth Circuit decision pre-
dated that circuit’s split and is binding on the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. 
City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (“This is the 
first case to be heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit . . . . We hold that the decisions of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit . . . shall be binding as precedent in the 
Eleventh Circuit”). 
151 United States v. Levy, 416 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2005). 
152 Id. at 1277. The Booker court expected “reviewing courts to apply 
ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue 
was raised below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test.” Booker, 543 
U.S. at 225. 
153 Levy, 416 F.3d at 1277 (quoting Shea, 451 U.S. at 58 n.4). 
PRIOR OUT 3/5/2007  12:35 AM 
270 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
The Eleventh Circuit also relied on recent Supreme Court 
precedent that arguably matches the circuit court’s approach to 
supplemental authority. Specifically, the Levy court noted154 the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Pasquantino v. United States,155 in 
which the Court declined to consider a Blakely claim not raised 
in the defendant’s petition for certiorari.156 Just as in the 
Eleventh Circuit, the High Court’s ruling was subject to 
criticism in the dissent, with Justice Ginsburg asserting that the 
failure to raise a Blakely/Booker claim “was no fault of the 
defendant’s . . . as the petition in this case was filed and granted 
well before the Court decided Blakely.”157 Though the Supreme 
Court’s rule in Pasquantino seems to lend an air of legitimacy to 
the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to supplement authority, the 
High Court’s rule is both distinguishable from the Eleventh 
Circuit’s rule and contrary to the Supreme Court’s own 
established precedent. 
To begin, a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court 
serves a different purpose than an appellate brief. An appellate 
brief lists all issues presented for review,158 but is filed after a 
circuit court has agreed to hear a case. A petition to the 
Supreme Court for certiorari requires a similar statement of 
issues.159 However, the Supreme Court, as the court of last 
review, has limited jurisdiction and uses petitions for certiorari 
to weed out cases and issues it will not review.160 Unlike a 
                                                          
154 Id. 
155 544 U.S. 349 (2005). 
156 Id. at 372 n.14. 
157 Id. at 377 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
158 See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(5). 
159 See SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a). 
160 See Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal., 503 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1992). 
The Court held that Rule 14.1 “provides the respondent with notice of the 
grounds on which certiorari is sought, thus relieving him of the expense of 
unnecessary litigation on the merits and the burden of opposing certiorari on 
unpresented questions. It also assists the Court in selecting the cases in which 
certiorari will be granted.” Id. The Court further noted that “[b]y forcing the 
parties to focus on the questions the Court views as particularly important, 
the Rule enables the Court to use its resources efficiently.” Id. at 521. 
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circuit court, the Supreme Court is not concerned with the 
outcome of a particular case, but instead with expansive legal 
issues.161 Therefore, the Court has more leeway to reject claims 
that may be dispositive in a particular case if the issue does not 
present the Court with a chance to hand down broad, binding 
precedent. For that reason, the Court has stated that denying 
review of claims not presented in the petition for certiorari 
“help[s] to maintain the integrity of the process of certiorari.”162 
The Supreme Court’s approach to new issues raised after 
petitions for certiorari are filed is somewhat inconsistent. The 
rule in Pasquantino is in conflict with its own precedent. The 
Court has held that it may review issues not raised in a 
certiorari petition for plain error.163 Therefore, rather than 
establishing a broad rule, the Pasquantino disposition of a new 
issue could be seen as a legitimate exercise of the Supreme 
Court’s discretion to adjudicate only cases addressing broad 
issues. At worst, the Supreme Court has a division within its 
ranks on this issue similar to that in the Tenth Circuit, which is 
the only circuit that has dealt with the problem of new issues 
raised after the filing of appellate briefs in the same manner as 
the Eleventh Circuit.164 
                                                          
161 Martin Guggenheim, State Intervention in the Family: Making a 
Federal Case Out of It, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 399, 410 (1984) (“correction of 
error in any particular case is not and should not be the primary purpose of 
the Supreme Court”). See also Howard S. Chasanow, Petitions for 
Certiorari-View from the Bench, APML MD-CLE 24-307 (2001) (“The 
purpose of the petition for certiorari is not to argue the merits of the appeal, 
but to convince the court that the case requires review because of the public 
interest or public importance of the issues involved.”). 
162 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 646 (1992). The Court 
also points out the Supreme Court Rules expressly forbid raising issues not 
raised in a petition for certiorari. Id. at 645 (quoting SUP. CT. R. 24.1(a)). 
163 See Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 717-18 (1962) (“While 
ordinarily we do not take note of errors not called to the attention of the 
Court of Appeals nor properly raised here, that rule is not without exception. 
The Court has the power to notice a plain error.”) (internal quotations 
omitted); Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 34 (1939) (“We have the power 
[to hear unraised issues] in the case of plain error.”) 
164 See infra Part V. 
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II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S REJECTION OF 
NEW ISSUES BASED ON POST-BRIEF AUTHORITY 
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach to new issues raised in 
supplemental filings may be in conflict with other circuits, but it 
is not completely unjustifiable. Though the court has rarely seen 
fit to explain its rule, an evaluation of circumstances in which 
the Eleventh Circuit has deviated from the general rule against 
hearing new issues raised on appeal but not raised in the trial 
court is helpful in explaining its rationale for rejecting un-
briefed issues. When discussing its reasoning, the court has put 
forth the same justifications that have been used to justify the 
“general rule,”165 including judicial economy and avoidance of 
prejudice to appellate parties.166 The Eleventh Circuit has further 
noted that allowing new issues to be raised in supplemental 
filings would conflict with the language of Rules 28(a)(5) and 
28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.167 
A. New Issues That Do Not Require Additional Facts 
Though the court has never explicitly said so, perhaps the 
Eleventh Circuit rejects new issues raised in supplemental filings 
because of the problems that arise when an appeals court tries to 
review an incomplete factual record. Often, when the Eleventh 
Circuit has departed from the general rule, it has done so only 
when additional facts would not aid the court’s determination of 
a new issue.168 
                                                          
165 For a full discussion of the rationale for the general rule, see 
Martineau, supra note 4, at 1026 and Dennerline, supra note 6, at 987-92. 
For a discussion of exceptions to the general rule, see Martineau, supra note 
4, at 1045-56 and Dennerline, supra note 6, at 996-1003. 
166 McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., 918 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 
1990). 
167 United States v. Smith, 416 F.3d 1350, 1352 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 1243-44 (11th Cir. 2004). The 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure state that a brief must contain “a 
statement of the issues presented for review.” FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(5). 
168 In passing, the court has noted that hearing of new issues on appeal is 
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For example, in Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co.,169 the 
court agreed to hear an automobile manufacturer’s argument that 
Georgia law did not provide for a wrongful death action under 
theories of breach of warranty or strict liability.170 The Eleventh 
Circuit held that “the new theory raises a purely legal question” 
and that “[n]o facts could have been developed to aid our 
resolution of the issue.”171 The court said under such 
circumstances, “it would be unjust now to refuse to consider the 
new argument.”172 
The Eleventh Circuit’s concern for an adequately developed 
factual record has been stated in numerous other cases, and pre-
dates the split of the Fifth Circuit and creation of the Eleventh 
Circuit. In Evans v. Triple R Welding & Oil Field Maintenance 
Corp.,173 the Fifth Circuit heard an appeal based on an alternate 
reading of the language of a contract.174 The third-party plaintiff 
in Evans, J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., sought 
indemnification in a lawsuit brought by a McDermott employee 
based on an express warranty contained in the contract between 
McDermott and Triple R.175 The Fifth Circuit noted that “[a]ll 
of the evidence pertaining to the case [was] in the record, 
including the contract between McDermott and Triple R, and 
there [was] no failure therefore to have adequate evidence before 
the Court.”176 
The Fifth Circuit emphasized the need for a complete factual 
                                                          
especially appropriate when the court below has granted summary judgment. 
Fane v. Edenfield, 945 F.2d 1514, 1519 n.11 (11th Cir. 1991). While the 
court declined to articulate a reason, presumably the court feels that the 
potential for a miscarriage of justice is greater when a pre-trial remedy 
removes a party’s ability to develop legal theories or factual underpinnings. 
169 540 F.2d 762 (11th Cir. 1976). 
170 Id. at 767-68. 
171 Id. at 768 n.10. The issue was raised in the original appellate briefs 
as per the court’s request. Id. 
172 Id. 
173 472 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1973). 
174 Id. at 716. 
175 Id. at 715-16. 
176 Id. at 716. 
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record even concerning meritorious new arguments. For 
example, in Empire Life Insurance Co. of America v. Valdak 
Corp.,177 the Fifth Circuit remanded for additional proceedings  
in order to develop facts related to a newly raised issue.178 The 
Eleventh Circuit, following pre-split precedent, allowed a new 
issue related to choice of law to be heard upon appeal in Roofing 
& Sheet Metal Services, Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc.,179 
and remanded for additional fact-finding so a new issue could be 
fairly litigated in Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea.180 
B. Allowing New Issues to Be Presented on Appeal Violates 
Rule 28 
Though it is difficult to discern whether the Eleventh Circuit 
refrains from hearing new issues on appeal specifically because 
of the potential for an inadequate factual record, the court has 
specifically stated that adherence to the language of Rules 
28(a)(5) and 28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires that new issues not be heard on appeal. In United States 
v. Levy, the court noted that “[t]o allow a new issue to be raised 
in a petition for rehearing circumvents Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 28(a)(5), which requires that an appellant’s initial 
brief must contain ‘a statement of the issues presented for 
review.’”181 The court stuck to its interpretation, and quoted 
Levy, in United States v. Smith.182 The Eleventh Circuit further 
elaborated its position in United States v. Nealy, stating once 
again, “[p]arties must submit all issues on appeal in their initial 
briefs.”183 The court admitted that supplemental filings have 
their role, but that role does not include raising new issues: 
“When new authority arises after a brief is filed, this circuit 
                                                          
177 468 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972). 
178 Id. at 334. 
179 689 F.2d 982, 989-91 (11th Cir. 1982). 
180 904 F.2d 1549, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990). 
181 United States v. Levy, 416 F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005). 
182 416 F.3d 1350, 1352, n.1 (11th Cir. 2005). 
183 United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 830 (11th Cir. 2000). 
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permits parties to submit supplemental authority on ‘intervening 
decisions or new developments’ regarding issues already 
properly raised in the initial briefs.”184 The court concluded, 
“parties cannot properly raise new issues at supplemental 
briefing, even if the issues arise based on the intervening 
decisions or new developments cited in the supplemental 
authority.”185 
The court supported its argument with a strict interpretation 
of Rule 28(j). In an earlier hearing of Levy’s appeal, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that new issues may not be raised in a 
28(j) letter because the rule “specifically states that a party must 
‘state the reasons for the supplemental citations, referring either 
to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally.’”186 The 
court, in a crushing blow to those hoping to raise a new issue 
based on post-brief authority, held that the language of Rule 
28(j) “underscores that an appellant’s supplemental authority 
must relate to an issue previously raised in a proper fashion, and 
that an appellant cannot raise a wholly new issue in a 
supplemental authority or brief.”187 For those reasons, the court 
has retained a strict rule against hearing new issues raised late in 
the appellate process—one that raises questions of fairness to 
both civil litigants and criminal defendants. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH 
While the Eleventh Circuit is acting lawfully when it 
enforces its procedural rules, two problems with the court’s 
approach require a change in the circuit’s position. First, the 
Eleventh Circuit’s rule has potential due process implications. It 
could be argued that the court deprives litigants of the 
“opportunity to present [their] case and be heard,”188 and 
                                                          
184 Id. (quoting 11th Cir. R. 28-1 I.O.P. 6) (emphasis in original). 
185 Id. 
186 United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting FED. R. APP. P. 28(j)) (emphasis in original). 
187 Id. at 1244. 
188 Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 681 
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thereby robs them of due process. Second, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s rule operates contrary to the intent behind recent 
changes to Rule 28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure which allow argument in filings noting supplemental 
authority.189 
A. Due Process and the Right to Be Heard 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution protect citizens from deprivations of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law.190 The Supreme Court has 
noted the due process guarantee extends to judicial 
proceedings,191 holding that due process, in its “primary sense,” 
means “an opportunity to be heard and to defend [a] substantive 
right.”192 The Court later said that “[t]he fundamental requisite 
of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”193 
While the Bordons and other litigants who face rejection of a 
new issue have not been entirely deprived of their right to be 
heard, they have been barred from arguing a potentially 
dispositive issue. Professors Adam Milani and Michael Smith 
argue that “being denied an opportunity that ultimately proves 
dispositive of a case is no different than a complete denial of an 
                                                          
(1930). 
189 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, at 46, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2001/amendments/toc.htm. 
190 U.S. CONST. amends. V, VIX, § 1. See also Adam A. Milani & 
Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by 
Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 262 (2002). 
191 Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings, 281 U.S. at 680 (“The federal 
guarantee of due process extends to state action through its judicial as well as 
through its legislative, executive or administrative branch of government.”). 
192 Id. at 678. 
193 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 
(1950) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). See also 
Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 466 (2000) (holding that a 
litigant’s opportunity to be heard on his claims is “fundamental to due 
process.”). 
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opportunity to be heard.”194 Milani and Smith note that without 
the chance to present arguments on a dispositive issue, “the 
opportunity to be heard is but a ‘teasing illusion.’”195 
Additionally, Professor Robert Martineau has argued that 
“[f]ailure to hear the parties on the issue that determines their 
case comes close to a basic denial of due process.”196 
Though the Eleventh Circuit seems to have carved out 
occasional exceptions to its rule,197 those exceptions are 
insufficient to protect litigants’ due process rights. The 
exceptions are rare,198 and virtually all recent Eleventh Circuit 
decisions reject new issues.199 The court has thus moved toward 
a blanket rule eliminating all consideration of new issues, 
thereby denying litigants their constitutional right to be heard. 
In particular, criminal defendants are harmed by the 
Eleventh Circuit’s rule. The due process guarantees in criminal 
trials are stronger than in civil cases.200 Indeed, “there is no 
question that in criminal cases the requirements of due process 
outweigh the principles of waiver.”201 Criminal appellants in the 
Eleventh Circuit are essentially at a due-process disadvantage. 
Even though the Bordons got their day in court, dismissal of an 
issue based on the barest procedural concerns “comes close to a 
basic denial of due process.”202 
                                                          
194 Milani & Smith, supra note 190, at 268. 
195 Id. (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)). Milani and Smith discuss due process concerns in 
a somewhat different context: the failure to hear arguments on the dispositive 
issue because a court has raised the issue sua sponte. Id. 
196 ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE 40 (1983). 
197 See supra note 112, discussing instances where the Eleventh Circuit 
has considered previously unraised issues for plain error. 
198 In his Levy dissent, Judge Tjoflat cited only two cases in support of 
his proposition that the Eleventh Circuit allowed for plain-error review of 
new issues. United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
199 See supra Part I. 
200 Martineau, supra note 4, at 1055. 
201 Id. 
202 MARTINEAU, supra note 196, at 40. 
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B. Recent Changes to Rule 28(j) 
Apart from the potential due process problems, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s rule barring new issues to be raised in a Rule 28(j) 
letter conflicts with recent changes to the rule. The previous 
version of the rule “required parties to describe supplemental 
authorities ‘without argument.’”203 Rule 28(j) was changed 
because “[e]nforcement of the restriction has been lax” due to 
difficulty distinguishing between a required statement explaining 
the need for supplemental authority and “argument.”204 Public 
comments supported the change to Rule 28(j), noting that the 
prohibition on argument was “frequently flouted.”205 The Rules 
Committee recommended changing the Rule to drop the 
prohibition on argument.206 The new rule—adopted in December 
2002—was designed to “permit[] parties to decide for 
themselves what they wish to say about supplemental 
authority.”207 
While the new version of Rule 28(j) is similar to older 
versions, the Rules Committee clearly intended that parties be 
allowed to present arguments based on new authority. While the 
Committee made no mention of intentionally disturbing the 
general rule, the allowance for argument indicates intent to use 
28(j) letters for advocacy. That intent, combined with the due 
process concerns and the willingness of other circuits to hear 
                                                          
203 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, at 46. See also Braley 
v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1510 (10th Cir. 1987) (sanctioning appellant’s 
counsel in part because he “violated Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) by making 
additional arguments in letters which ostensibly provided the court with 
supplemental authorities. Such arguments are improper and further burden the 
court and counsel.”). 
204 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, at 46. 
205 See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and Form 6, at 103-05, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc0901.html. 
206 Id. at 103. 
207 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, at 46. 
PRIOR OUT 3/5/2007  12:35 AM 
 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT & SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 279 
new arguments in 28(j) letters, indicates that the Eleventh 
Circuit erroneously dismisses new arguments based on 
supplemental authority. 
IV. HOW OTHER JURISDICTIONS APPROACH SUPPLEMENTAL 
AUTHORITY 
While the Eleventh Circuit has been able to support its 
procedural rule, other circuits have presented a more flexible 
approach to supplemental authority. Both the First and Sixth 
Circuits have clearly articulated rules on allowing post-brief, 
supplemental authority as a source of new arguments.208 Other 
circuits have heard arguments based on cases decided post-
brief,209 or expressed a willingness to do so had an appellant 
properly filed a 28(j) letter.210 Additionally, numerous states 
have interpreted their rules of appellate procedure as being 
flexible enough to allow for review of post-brief supplemental 
authority.211 
A. The First Circuit: United States v. Cordoza-Estrada 
Silvierio Cordoza-Estrada was convicted of re-entering the 
United States after being deported and sentenced to 18 months in 
prison and three years of supervised release.212 Cordoza-Estrada 
was deported in 2001 after being convicted in New Hampshire 
                                                          
208 See United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 377 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d 35, 45 n.10 (1st Cir. 2004). 
209 See United States v. Soy, 413 F.3d 594, 615 (7th Cir. 2005). 
210 Structural Indus., Inc. v. United States, 356 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
211 See, e.g., State v. Resendis-Felix, 100 P.3d 457, 459 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2004) review granted, remanded to No. CR-05-0031-PR, 2005 WL 2414769 
(Ariz. Sep. 27, 2005) remanded to No. 2 CA-CR 2003-0114-PR, 2005 WL 
2787475 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2005); Rolling v. State, 619 So. 2d 20, 23 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Rochelle v. State, 791 S.W.2d 121, 124-25 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1990). 
212 United States v. Cordoza-Estrada, 385 F.3d 56, 57 (1st Cir. 2004). 
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of simple assault.213 His assault conviction in state court was 
treated as an aggravated felony for the purpose of his federal 
sentence for the crime of re-entering the United States.214 
Cordoza-Estrada appealed the determination that his New 
Hampshire conviction was an “aggravated felony” under the 
meaning of the federal sentencing guidelines that mandated an 
increased sentence.215 He later appealed his sentence based on 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely.216 
Cordoza-Estrada’s Blakely appeal was filed in a 28(j) 
letter.217 The court agreed to consider the Blakely argument, 
saying that “since appellant’s argument depends upon a decision 
that did not exist at the time of briefing, a 28(j) letter is a 
perfectly appropriate avenue by which to present it—such letters 
are intended to provide the court with new authority.”218 The 
court eventually rejected Cordoza-Estrada’s arguments on the 
merits.219 
The First Circuit has also agreed to hear arguments based on 
post-brief authority under the “plain error” jurisdiction available 
to appellate courts.220 The court observed that “where a party is 
raising a new issue in response to a potentially crucial Supreme 
Court decision that issued only after briefing and oral argument 
were completed,” a different analysis applies than would if the 
party had waived or forfeited the issue.221 Additionally, the First 
Circuit has indicated a willingness to consider arguments first 
put forth in a 28(j) letter where the parties have failed to file 
such letters.222 
                                                          
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 59. 
217 Id. 
218 United States v. Cordoza-Estrada, 385 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2004). 
219 Id. 
220 United States v. Morgan, 384 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2004). 
221 Id. at 7-8. 
222 United States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d 35, 45 n.10 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The 
Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington after oral argument in this 
case. Cheal has not submitted a letter of supplemental authority under Fed. 
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B. The Sixth Circuit: United States v. Oliver 
David Oliver was convicted of conspiracy to possess 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute and sentenced to 180 
months in prison and five years of supervised release.223 Oliver 
appealed his conviction, asserting several errors in the district 
court.224 He also initially appealed his sentence, saying his flight 
from a drug-treatment program was improperly considered an 
obstruction of justice.225 Oliver later filed a 28(j) letter citing 
Blakely and asserting that the sentence imposed violated his 
Sixth Amendment rights.226 He also filed a second letter seeking 
relief under Booker.227 
The Sixth Circuit agreed to consider Oliver’s Blakely and 
Booker claims, citing the First Circuit’s rule in Cordoza-Estrada 
that a 28(j) letter is the appropriate filing for relevant post-brief 
authority that raises new issues.228 The court ruled that “the 
steps taken by Oliver both before and after oral argument were 
sufficient to raise on appeal the issue of the constitutionality of 
Oliver’s sentence.”229 In a strong statement supporting the First 
Circuit’s understanding of Rule 28(j), the court held that Oliver 
“complied with [the] requirements of Rule 28(j)” and properly 
brought the Blakely/Booker claims before the court.230 The Sixth 
Circuit vacated Oliver’s sentence based on Booker and remanded 
to the district court for re-sentencing.231 
                                                          
R. App. P. 28(j) challenging her sentence based on Blakely’s possible 
application to the federal sentencing guidelines. Consequently, we do not 
address the issue.”) (citations omitted). 
223 United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 374 (6th Cir. 2005). 
224 Id. at 374. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 377 n.1. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 377 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 381-82. 
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C. State Court Approaches to Post-Brief Authority 
Numerous states have dealt with the issue of relevant 
authority decided after the submission of appellate briefs. For 
example, Kostia Ivan Resendis-Felix pled guilty to aggravated 
robbery in Arizona.232 Resendis-Felix appealed his sentence, 
saying the trial court failed to take into account mitigating 
factors.233 While his appeal was pending, Resendis-Felix filed a 
notice of supplemental authority arguing that his sentence should 
be vacated in light of Blakely.234 The State objected to Resendis-
Felix’s Blakely claim, arguing that any such claim had been 
waived because it had not been raised.235 Nonetheless, the 
Arizona Court of Appeals held the Blakely arguments raised by 
Resendis-Felix amounted to fundamental error, and as such 
could be heard by the court regardless of issues of waiver.236 
The court vacated Resendis-Felix’s sentence and remanded for 
re-sentencing pursuant to Blakely.237 
Similarly, in Florida—the site of the Bordons’ ill-fated 
gambling and money-laundering operation—the state courts have 
considered post-brief supplemental authority on numerous 
occasions. In 1993, a Florida appeals court vacated a sentence 
based on a recent Florida Supreme Court ruling raised by 
appellant in a supplemental briefing.238 Likewise, a Florida 
appeals court heard but rejected an argument by the State based 
on supplemental authority in an appeal of final orders in a 
juvenile delinquency hearing.239 Finally, the Florida Supreme 
Court considered an appeal of a criminal sentence based on 
                                                          
232 State v. Resendis-Felix, 100 P.3d 457, 458 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). 
233 Id. at 459. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 State v. Resendis-Felix, 100 P.3d 457, 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). 
Resendis-Felix’s sentence was later reinstated because he admitted to facts 
that increased his sentence. Resendis-Felix, 2005 WL 2787475 at *1. 
238 Rolling v. State, 619 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
239 J.M.J. v. State, 742 So. 2d 261, 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
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supplemental authority—Blakely and Ring v. Arizona240—but 
rejected the arguments on their merits.241 
Hawaii seems to have the most expansive rule on acceptance 
of post-brief new issues. The Hawaii Supreme Court considered 
post-brief authority sua sponte, though the court ultimately held 
that the authority (Booker) was not applicable to the case before 
it.242 A dissenting opinion held that the court improperly 
considered Booker and should have applied it to the instant case 
only if raised by the parties in Hawaii’s equivalent of a 28(j) 
letter.243 
D. Split Within the Circuit: The Tenth Circuit’s Rule on 
Post-Brief Supplemental Authority Mirrors That of the 
Eleventh Circuit 
While most jurisdictions are willing to hear arguments based 
on new issues, the Eleventh Circuit’s approach is mirrored by a 
divided Supreme Court,244 with greater authority to dispose of 
issues, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has a 
somewhat muddled rule concerning the consideration of new 
issues, but seems to rely on the Eleventh Circuit for guidance. 
The Tenth Circuit has barred new issues raised first in a 28(j) 
letter but not in a party’s appellate brief while apparently 
allowing new issues when presented in an appellate brief.245 The 
court based its rule regarding 28(j) letters in part on Eleventh 
Circuit precedent.246 
                                                          
240 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In Ring, the Supreme Court held that a death 
sentence imposed after determinations of fact made by a trial judge and not 
the jury violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 609. 
241 Conahan v. State, 844 So. 2d 629, 642 n.9 (Fla. 2003). 
242 State v. Maugaotega, 114 P.3d 905, 913-16 (Haw. 2005). 
243 Id. at 916-17 (Acoba, J., dissenting). 
244 See supra Part I. 
245 See United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1346 n.16 (11th Cir. 
2004) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). A seemingly conflicting line of decisions was 
explained by opining that “the court was holding only that a Rule 28(j) letter 
is not a proper venue for raising a new argument.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
246 United States v. Rosales, 112 F. App’x 685, 692 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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In United States v. Rosales, the Tenth Circuit declined to 
consider appellant’s arguments based on Blakely, rejecting a 
28(j) letter raising Sixth Amendment claims.247 The court 
reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Horn,248 
rejecting a 28(j) letter asserting a Blakely claim because, “prior 
to the letter, Mr. Horn did not challenge the district court’s 
ability to determine the facts resulting in his sentencing 
calculation . . . . In that Mr. Horn did not seek permission to 
file a brief properly raising the Blakely issue, we decline to 
consider the matter further.”249 Similarly, in United States v. 
Taing,250 the Tenth Circuit rejected a Booker argument as 
waived.251 
The Tenth Circuit’s rejection of new issues seems to be 
based on the filing in which they are presented. For example, in 
United States v. Badilla,252 the court reviewed a Blakely claim 
that was presented in a Motion for Post-Submission 
Consideration.253 The court reviewed for plain error but found 
that any error stemming from a failure to consider Badilla’s 
claims that his sentence was enhanced by factual issues not 
determined by a jury did not “seriously affect[] the fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.”254 
                                                          
247 Id. 
248 113 F. App’x 355 (10th Cir. 2004). 
249 Id. at 358. 
250 135 F. App’x 177 (10th Cir. 2005). 
251 Id. at 181. 
252 383 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 2004). 
253 Id. at 1142 n.2. 
254 Id. The Tenth Circuit reviewed its decision in Badilla upon remand 
from the Supreme Court. See Badilla v. United States, 543 U.S. 1098 (2005). 
On remand, the court of appeals reinstated all portions of its prior opinion 
except note 2, finding that because Badilla 
failed to establish that his substantial rights were affected by the 
district court’s application of the obstruction of justice 
enhancement, there [was] no need to proceed on to the fourth 
prong of the plain error analysis [of whether the error seriously 
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings]. 
 United States v. Badilla, 419 F.3d 1128, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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Similarly, in United States v. Westover, the Tenth Circuit 
similarly granted a defendant’s motion to supplement his 
appellate brief to raise a Blakely claim.255 The court rejected a 
number of challenges to Westover’s conviction, but retained 
jurisdiction to address Blakely issues raised in a supplemental 
brief.256 Eleventh Circuit Judge Tjoflat, discussing the apparent 
conflict between the Tenth Circuit’s rulings in cases such as 
Horn, Taing and Rosales, and its willingness to allow new issues 
in Badilla and Westover, noted: 
the court was only holding that a Rule 28(j) letter is 
not a proper vehicle for raising a new argument—i.e., 
Rule 28(j) letters should be used only to identify new 
authority relating to arguments already raised—and 
that the defendant waived his right to raise a Blakely 
claim by not properly seeking permission to file a 
supplemental brief.257 
The Tenth Circuit thus leaves the door open—if only 
slightly—for new issues in a way that the Eleventh Circuit does 
not. However, the split among the circuits calls for a change to 
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to bring all circuits in 
line with notions of fairness to appellate litigants. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: RULE 28(J)(2) 
While the Eleventh Circuit’s rule on hearing new issues 
based on post-brief authority is supported by the Tenth Circuit’s 
less stringent rule, the Eleventh Circuit’s approach conflicts with 
the law in other federal jurisdictions. This inconsistency results 
in unpredictable outcomes for litigants and deprives parties 
appearing before the Eleventh Circuit of their right to be heard. 
In order to standardize how federal appeals courts deal with new 
issues that derive from supplemental authority, an addition to the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is necessary. 
                                                          
255 United States v. Westover, 107 F. App’x 840, 847 (10th Cir. 2004). 
256 Id. 
257 United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1346 n.16 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
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Appellate parties seeking to introduce new issues based on 
recent authority rely now on Rule 28(j) of the Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure. That rule reads: 
If pertinent and significant authorities come to a 
party’s attention after the party’s brief has been 
filed—or after oral argument but before decision—a 
party may promptly advise the circuit clerk by letter, 
with a copy to all other parties, setting forth the 
citations. The letter must state the reasons for the 
supplemental citations, referring either to the page of 
the brief or to a point argued orally. The body of the 
letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response must 
be made promptly and must be similarly limited.258 
The command that a 28(j) letter refer to the relevant “page 
of the brief or to a point argued orally” when declaring why the 
supplemental authority is relevant has been citied as justification 
for declining to hear new issues in supplementary filings.259 
Thus, by tying consideration of new authority to issues 
previously raised, Rule 28(j) could be said to limit how a filing 
under the rule can bring to the court’s attention new law that 
will be dispositive.260 The solution is a new subsection to Rule 
28(j) which will provide a limited vehicle for addressing new 
issues based on recently issued controlling authority. 
The current Rule 28(j) should become subparagraph (1) of 
the Rule. A new addition to the rule, Rule 28(j)(2), should read: 
If significant authorities representing a change in 
existing law come to a party’s attention after the 
party’s brief has been filed—or after oral argument 
but before decision—a party should promptly advise 
                                                          
258 FED. R. APP. P. 28(j). 
259 See supra Part III. 
260 See United States v. Smith, 416 F.3d 1350, 1352 n.1 (11th Cir. 
2005) (holding that allowing a Rule 28(j) letter to raise a new issue would 
circumvent the requirements of Rule 28(a)(5); United States v. Levy, 416 
F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (“To allow a new issue to be raised in a 
petition for rehearing circumvents Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
28(a)(5).”). 
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the circuit clerk by letter, with a copy to all other 
parties, setting forth the citations. The letter must 
state the significance of the new authority and briefly 
list any new issues raised by such authority. The 
body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any 
response must be made promptly and must be 
similarly limited. 
The proposed Rule 28(j)(2) guarantees at least some review 
of any new law that is handed down while an appeal is pending, 
but still allows a court of appeals to set procedural rules. By 
requiring that new issues raised in a 28(j)(2) letter be raised by 
supplemental authority, the new subparagraph would not serve 
as a last chance for appellate counsel to raise issues previously 
waived, forfeited or abandoned. Instead, Rule 28(j)(2) would 
allow for intervening case law to raise a new, pertinent and 
possibly dispositive issue in keeping with the due process rights 
of defendants and appellants. 
This addition to Rule 28(j) protects the interests of adverse 
appellate parties. The proposed rule mirrors the existing 
language of Rule 28(j), which allows for a response that “must 
be made promptly and must be similarly limited.”261 Allowing 
an adverse appellate party to argue new authority within the 
same limitation preserves that party’s due process rights. 
Additionally, a party which finds itself on the wrong side of 
newly decided authority has the option to petition for a re-
hearing by the full panel of a court of appeals.262 Therefore, 
prejudice to adverse parties will not be a concern if Rule 28(j) is 
modified. 
A potential drawback to Rule 28(j)(2) is the possibility of 
overburdening courts with new issues that need to be decided 
very late in the appellate process—including, possibly, after a 
panel has heard and discussed the case. While such concerns are 
valid, the Rule would protect the judicial system by limiting the 
parties to 350 words. The limitation—which is just as strict as 
that which appears in the current Rule 28(j)—gives the party 
                                                          
261 Limited, that is, to 350 words. 
262 See FED. R. APP. P. 40. 
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seeking review of new authority a chance to present relevant 
case law without requiring the court to delve into an entirely 
new brief. Of course, the court retains the option of ordering 
supplemental briefing on any issue where additional filings 
would be helpful. 
It is possible that courts might be burdened by the raising of 
numerous or frivolous issues in 28(j)(2) letters. However, the 
concern is a minor one, at worst. Ironically, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s defense of its rule on hearing new issues demonstrates 
why frivolous 28(j)(2) claims will be rare. As the court pointed 
out in Levy, attorneys already have an incentive to raise all 
possible claims at various stages of the trial and appellate 
process—to preserve issues for de novo review.263 Attorneys 
have refrained from doing so, likely because they recognize the 
futility of raising long-shot issues and the possibility of Rule 11 
sanctions for raising frivolous claims. It is unlikely that 
attorneys will suddenly become emboldened by a last chance to 
raise an issue, especially since the proposed language of Rule 
28(j)(2) requires that any supplemental authority cited in a filing 
under this Rule “represent . . . a change in existing law.” This 
limiting clause, along with the 350-word limit, will reduce any 
burden on appellate courts while still affording appellants the 
opportunity to raise new case law that could prove dispositive. 
CONCLUSION 
The general rule against hearing previously unraised issues 
on appeal is a sound principle of appellate procedure that does 
much to safeguard the interests of all parties. However, like 
virtually every other rule, the general rule has sound exceptions, 
including an intervening change in the law. The Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals, to the dismay of several of its judges, has 
ignored this exception to the general rule when considering new 
issues raised in supplemental filings. It is the most restrictive of 
all circuits that have dealt with this issue in recent years, and is 
the only circuit with a blanket rule rejecting new issues raised 
                                                          
263 United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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by supplemental authority. The Eleventh Circuit’s approach is 
unfair to litigants and criminal defendants. The court’s ban on 
new issues raised in supplemental authority has due process 
implications and runs contrary to the intent of recent changes to 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28. 
An addition to Rule 28(j) would bring the Eleventh Circuit in 
line with other courts of appeal. If the Rule were modified to 
allow appellate parties to raise supplemental authority 
“representing a change in existing law,” circuit courts would be 
required to give some sort of review to new issues raised in 
28(j) letters. The language of the proposed Rule 28(j)(2) will 
sufficiently limit the burden on appellate courts, and will protect 
adverse parties by allowing a chance for reply. This change to 
Rule 28(j) will ensure justice for the Bordons, Raphael Levy and 
all defendants and litigants who see a dispositive issue decided 
just a little too late. 
 
